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Judgment of Ingroups and Outgroups in Intra- and Intercultural Negotiation:  
The Role of Interdependent Self-Construal in Judgment Timing

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## ABSTRACT

Extending the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner et al., 1993) and social categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), the current study investigates *when* superordinate categorization with an opponent occurs during intra- and intercultural integrative negotiation. I hypothesize that a high level of interdependent self-construal (Markus and Kitayama, 1991) is associated with early superordinate categorization with an opponent and favorable judgment of an opponent's cultural group before negotiation takes place, whereas a low level of interdependent self-construal shows favorable judgment of an ingroup and outgroup after negotiation is closed. One hundred fourteen participants of the U.S. and the Republic of Korea completed a multi-issue negotiation simulation with integrative potential in either intracultural or intercultural dyads. Results support the hypotheses. I discuss theoretical and practical implications of the sensitivity of interdependent self-construal to social context and fluid boundaries of ingroups and outgroups, and the role of integrative negotiation in improving intergroup relations in globalizing and multicultural organizations and societies.

Keywords: Negotiation, Intergroup relations, Interdependent self-construal, Time

Globalization has increased cultural diversity in organizations—people work in culturally heterogeneous teams, international virtual teams, or cross-cultural negotiation (Earley and Gibson, 2002; Brett, 2001). Although diverse cultural values and practices should introduce novel perspectives and improve organizational innovation, anxieties and conflicts prevail in managing cultural diversity (Glazer, 1997; Schlesinger, 1992). In fact, the literature in social psychology and cultural adaptation predicts negative intergroup relations associated with cultural diversity. For example, members of the cultural majority tend to be prejudiced toward, and stigmatize, members of a cultural minority (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Accordingly, members of a cultural minority experience psychological distress, negative ingroup identity, and social rejection (Kim, 1995; Liebkind and Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2000).

Despite its practical and theoretical importance, empirical research on cultural diversity has been surprisingly scant (Williams and O'Reilly, 1998). The current study asks the following question to fill the gap in the literature: How can ingroup and outgroup relations be more positive for people's experience of living in a culturally heterogeneous society? This question is important because a positive ingroup identity of members of a cultural minority increases their psychological well-being and adaptability to the host culture. As well, amicable intergroup relations among members of the cultural majority and members of a cultural minority harmonize cultural diversity and expedite social integration in multicultural organizations and societies.

To this end, I extend the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner et al., 1993) to the context of dyadic negotiation and argue that integrative negotiation, wherein cooperative interdependence exists in managing conflict, facilitates superordinate

categorization among negotiators, which, in turn, enhances favorable judgment of a counterpart's cultural group. For example, intercultural negotiation among members of the cultural majority and members of a cultural minority increases favorable judgment of an outgroup, and intracultural negotiation within a cultural minority improves the minority members' judgment of the ingroup. Further, I investigate *when* favorable judgment of an ingroup and outgroup arises during integrative negotiation, as well as its underlying psychological mechanism. Research on ingroup/outgroup judgment has overlooked the effect of time on subsequent interaction and attitude change (cf. Harrison, Price, and Bell, 1998; Chatman and Flynn, 2001). The current study contributes to the literature on ingroup/outgroup judgment by investigating judgment timing and its psychological mechanism in intergroup contact.

### **The Common Ingroup Identity Model and Judgment Timing**

The common ingroup identity model posits that cognitive representation as a common group that includes outgroup members reduces hostile attitudes toward outgroups (Gaertner et al., 1993) because superordinate categorization as one common group increases an individual's perception of similarities and attraction to outgroup members (Byrne, 1971). According to the common ingroup identity model, superordinate categorization with outgroup members often results from cooperative interdependence arising from a common goal, shared interests, and a communal fate relating to the outcome of a joint effort (Gaertner et al., 1990; Deschamps and Brown, 1983; Johnson and Johnson, 1975). Thus, cooperative interdependence encourages favorable judgment of outgroups (Allport, 1954; Deutsch, 1973; Sherif et al., 1954) through superordinate categorization

with the outgroup members. As such, the common ingroup identity model underscores the importance of superordinate categorization.

This suggests that integrative negotiation, wherein cooperative interdependence exists in both parties in joint problem solving, may stimulate superordinate categorization among negotiators and, in turn, favorable judgment of the other party's group. Indeed, Messick and Mackie (1989) suggest that negotiation improves intergroup relations because while negotiating, both parties develop shared interests and goals and realize that goal attainment depends on the cooperation of the other party (e.g., Pruitt and Rubin, 1986). However, negotiation in which cooperative interdependence is lacking, such as in distributive bargaining, in which one party's gain is the other party's loss, has been found to exacerbate negative intergroup relations (Thompson, 1993).

The common ingroup identity model also concedes that superordinate categorization as a common group including outgroup members can occur *without* previous intergroup cooperation (Gaertner et al., 1993). From that, I extrapolate that superordinate categorization with a negotiation opponent may occur even before an integrative negotiation begins. Social categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) supports this prediction. Specifically, social categorization theorists claim that upon perceiving another person, people quickly categorize the person as an ingroup or outgroup member on the basis of perceptual cues such as ethnicity, age, and gender without a prior interaction (Turner et al., 1987). Thus it appears that even before an intra- or intercultural negotiation takes place, some negotiators may be able to achieve superordinate categorization with the other party as though they already share the common interests, goals, and fate of the upcoming joint effort.

The early superordinate categorization occurs while negotiators prepare and plan for an upcoming negotiation. Before coming to the table, they thoroughly analyze their own interests, priorities, goals, and negotiation strategies as well as those of the other party (Bazerman and Neale, 1992; Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991; Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton, 1999). In so doing, negotiators may focus on similarities or differences. This is similar to the social categorization process, whereby people compare themselves with another person on the basis of perceptions of similarities or differences during an initial encounter (Turner et al., 1987). I propose that those who focus more on similarities than differences make the early superordinate categorization while planning for an upcoming negotiation and, as a result, develop favorable judgment of the other party's cultural group even before they embark on an integrative negotiation.

### **Interdependent Self-Construal and Early Superordinate Categorization**

The literature implies that perception of similarities and superordinate categorization with the other party occur quickly in individuals whose self-schemas are interdependent with the way others think, feel, and behave (that is, they possess *interdependent self-construal*). According to Markus and Kitayama (1991), self-schemas differ among members of Eastern versus Western cultures. Members of Western cultures, such as those in the U.S. or northern Europe, self-define in terms of their unique traits, attributes, and personalities (i.e., through independent self-construal, for example, "I am inquisitive," "I am tall"). Conversely, members of East Asian cultures often define themselves in terms of connection, affiliation, roles, and responsibilities associated with important social relationships (i.e., by interdependent self-construal, for example, "I am a doctoral student at Cornell University," "I am the youngest in my family"). Recent

development in cultural psychology suggests that independent and interdependent self-construal co-exist within a single individual regardless of cultural origin. Across cultures all individuals can have high or low levels of independent and interdependent self-construal and, depending on the particular context, can define themselves as relatively more or less interdependent with, or independent of, close others' thoughts, emotions, and behaviors (Gardner, Gabriel, and Lee, 1999; Lee, Aaker, and Gardner, 2000; Singelis, 1994). In the current study I focus only on interdependent self-construal because it explains superordinate categorization with others, as described below.

Stapel and Koomen (2001) demonstrate that when experimentally primed with interdependent self-construal, individuals make an assimilation-based social comparison with others (e.g., "I am similar to her") (see also Aaker and Schmitt, 2001; Kim and Markus, 1999) because interdependent self-construal motivates individuals to connect and bond (van Baaren et al., 2003; Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Thus it appears that individuals who have a high level of interdependent self-construal may compare similarities more than differences between their and the other party's negotiation goals and interests before negotiation and so develop superordinate categorization with the other party early—even prior to actual negotiation.

The literature also documents that interdependent self-construal is sensitive to social context (Kubnen, Hannover, and Schubert, 2001; Masuda and Nisbett, 2001; Kanagawa, Cross, and Markus, 2001). For example, individuals who have a high level of interdependent self-construal process perceptual stimuli in relation to their surroundings (Kubnen et al., 2001) and change self-definitions flexibly across situations (Suh, 2002; Kanagawa et al., 2001). Specifically, Kanagawa, Cross, and Markus (2001) demonstrate

that when placed in various situations—with peers, with professors, in groups, or alone—individuals who have a high level of interdependent self-construal define themselves in exceedingly different ways. Together, this suggests that they are sensitive to the social context of an upcoming negotiation, whether it be an intercultural or intracultural negotiation; thus they perform superordinate categorization with a member of an ingroup or outgroup accordingly.

### **Judgment of an Outgroup before Negotiating**

When planning for an intercultural negotiation (that is, negotiation between members of the cultural majority and members of a cultural minority), individuals who have a high level of interdependent self-construal are likely to perform superordinate categorization with an outgroup counterpart. People living in a multicultural society have two identities (Kim, 1995): one based on distinct native-country affiliation (e.g., in the current study, Korean nationals or U.S. citizens) and the other based on shared identity as individuals living together in the multicultural society (e.g., in the current study, U.S. residents). When planning for an intercultural negotiation, those who have a high level of interdependent self-construal will notice a similarity as U.S. residents and categorize superordinately with an outgroup counterpart. Thus I predict that when planning for an upcoming intercultural negotiation, such individuals will show more favorable judgment of an outgroup than those who have a low level of interdependent self-construal.

***Hypothesis 1:** When planning for an intercultural negotiation (that is, negotiation between members of the cultural majority and members of a cultural minority), individuals who have a high level of interdependent self-construal will report more favorable judgment of an outgroup than individuals who have a low level of interdependent self-construal.*

### **Judgment of an Ingroup before Negotiating**

The literature on cultural adaptation documents that members of a cultural minority make unfavorable judgment of their own group (Kim, 1995; Liebkind and Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2000). This is sharply contrasted with the predominant research finding in social psychology that most people judge ingroups overly favorably and outgroups unfavorably (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Because members of a cultural minority tend to be subject to prejudice and stigmatized by members of the cultural majority, they experience conflict and ambiguity in their cultural identity, low self-esteem, and low ingroup identification (Kim, 1995; Liebkind and Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2000). Therefore it appears that the ingroup judgment by members of a cultural minority might fluctuate more depending on whether they anticipate a negotiation with members of the cultural majority—those who tend to show prejudice and stigmatize them—or a negotiation with their own group members. Before formulating specific hypotheses regarding this, I first predict that members of a cultural minority make less favorable judgment of an ingroup than members of the cultural majority.

***Hypothesis 2:** Members of a cultural minority will report less favorable judgment of an ingroup than members of the cultural majority.*

Although members of a cultural minority may show unfavorable judgment of an ingroup in general (Hypothesis 2), members of a cultural minority *who have a high level of interdependent self-construal* might be able to see similarities with the other party when planning for an upcoming negotiation (Stapel and Koomen, 2001; Aaker and Schmitt, 2001; Kim and Markus, 1999). When planning for a negotiation with their ingroup, members of a cultural minority who have a high level of interdependent self-construal will

sense the ingroup similarity with the other party, such as native national group membership and same language, to a greater extent than members of a cultural minority who have a low level of interdependent self-construal. Thus, they are predicted to perform superordinate categorization with the other party of their ingroup before an intracultural negotiation begins. In turn, this superordinate categorization with an ingroup member will lead members of a cultural minority who have a high level of interdependent self-construal to develop favorable judgment of an ingroup (Smith and Henry, 1996) prior to negotiation.

***Hypothesis 3a:** When planning for an intracultural negotiation (that is, negotiation within a cultural minority), members of a cultural minority who have a high level of interdependent self-construal will report more favorable judgment of an ingroup than members of a cultural minority who have a low level of interdependent self-construal.*

Stephan and Stephan (1984), however, suggest that when members of a cultural minority who have a high level of interdependent self-construal plan for a negotiation with members of the cultural majority, they might focus on similarities with the outgroup member and downplay the ingroup identity. The authors argue that intergroup contact poses intense anxieties and fears. When anticipating a negotiation with the cultural majority outgroup, members of a cultural minority may overestimate the negative features of their ingroup (e.g., stigmatization by the cultural majority, Liebkind and Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2000). In particular, members of a cultural minority who have a high level of interdependent self-construal might focus on similarities with the negotiation partner of the outgroup (Stapel and Koomen, 2001), as they continually interact to share the same space and the resources in it. Relatively speaking, when anticipating a negotiation with members of the cultural majority, members of a cultural minority who have a high level of

interdependent self-construal might become apprehensive about the negative ingroup identity and want to devalue their native cultural group to avoid a negative ingroup reputation fostered by the cultural majority.

***Hypothesis 3b:** When planning for an intercultural negotiation (that is, negotiation between members of the cultural majority and members of a cultural minority), members of a cultural minority who have a high level of interdependent self-construal will report less favorable judgment of an ingroup than members of a cultural minority who have a low level of interdependent self-construal.*

### **Superordinate Categorization during Integrative Negotiation**

Individuals who have a *low* level of interdependent self-construal cannot make an assimilation-based social comparison as easily as individuals who have a high level (Stapel and Koomen, 2001). Thus, they are not likely to develop favorable judgment of an ingroup or outgroup before a negotiation starts. In general, negotiators have competitive expectations of their opponent before negotiating (Thompson and Hastie, 1990). As a result, individuals who have a low level of interdependent self-construal may start a negotiation with competitive and unfavorable attitudes toward the other party. However, because integrative negotiation provides leeway for negotiators to reach mutually agreeable conclusions (Bazerman and Neale, 1992; Lewicki et al., 1999), the negotiation process turns out to be less competitive and more cooperative than initially expected by individuals who have a low level of interdependent self-construal.

While exchanging information to make a deal with win-win integrative strategies, individuals who have a low level of interdependent self-construal realize that their interests and priorities are not directly opposed to those of the other party and that cooperative

interdependence does exist between the two parties (Thompson and Hastie, 1990; Pruitt and Rubin, 1986). As Messick and Mackie (1989) suggest, therefore, integrative negotiation improves intergroup relations because, in the negotiation process, both parties develop shared interests and goals cooperatively. And this perception and experience of cooperative interdependence during the negotiation process leads individuals who have a low level of interdependent self-construal to develop superordinate categorization with the other party and favorable judgment of the other party's group (Gaertner et al., 1990).

### **Judgment of an Outgroup after Negotiating**

During intercultural negotiation with members of either the cultural majority or a cultural minority, individuals who have a low level of interdependent self-construal are likely to realize the common superordinate group identity (in the present study, as U.S. residents) with an outgroup member. Due to the discovery of cooperative interdependence through common interests and priorities and win-win integrative strategies, individuals who have a low level of interdependent self-construal realize that members of the cultural majority and members of a cultural minority do share the common ingroup identity. Compared with individuals who have a high level of interdependent self-construal, who might show favorable judgment of an outgroup early on while planning for an intercultural negotiation (Hypothesis 1), individuals who have a low level of interdependent self-construal are likely to develop favorable judgment of an outgroup after negotiation.

***Hypothesis 4:** After intercultural negotiation (that is, negotiation between members of the cultural majority and members of a cultural minority), individuals who have a low level of interdependent self-construal will report a greater increase in favorable judgment of an outgroup than individuals who have a high level of interdependent self-construal.*

### **Judgment of an Ingroup after Negotiating**

Recalling that members of a cultural minority may judge an ingroup less favorably than members of the cultural majority (Hypothesis 2), I speculate that cooperative interdependence during an integrative negotiation with an ingroup member is likely to benefit members of a cultural minority more than members of the cultural majority in developing superordinate categorization with an ingroup member and favorable judgment of the cultural minority ingroup (e.g., Gaertner et al., 1993). That is, integrative negotiation among members of a cultural minority might improve the minority members' negative ingroup identity and unfavorable judgment of an ingroup (Kim, 1995; Liebkind and Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2000). Specifically, because members of a cultural minority who have a high level of interdependent self-construal might demonstrate favorable judgment of an ingroup early, prior to an intracultural negotiation (Hypothesis 3a), an integrative negotiation contact with an ingroup member might not drastically increase their already favorable judgment of that ingroup. However, because members of a cultural minority who have a *low* level of interdependent self-construal might start an intracultural negotiation with negative ingroup judgment (e.g., Hypothesis 2), they are likely to show a greater increase in their favorable judgment of the ingroup after negotiating with an ingroup member than members of a cultural minority who have a high level of interdependent self-construal.

***Hypothesis 5:** After intracultural negotiation (that is, negotiation within a cultural minority), members of a cultural minority who have a low level of interdependent self-construal will report a greater increase in favorable judgment of an ingroup than members of a cultural minority who have a high level of interdependent self-construal.*

## Methods

### Participants

One hundred fourteen students participated in this study. Participants included 56 U.S. students and 58 Korean students at a large Northeastern university in the U.S. Random assignment into U.S.-U.S., Korean-Korean, or U.S.-Korean dyads resulted in 39 intracultural dyads (19 U.S.-U.S. dyads and 20 Korean-Korean dyads) and 18 intercultural dyads. The cultural majority sample was drawn from U.S. citizens recruited from an undergraduate subject pool at the university. The cultural minority sample consisted of Korean students on the same campus (either international students or permanent residents of the U.S.) recruited from the Korean undergraduate and graduate student organizations. All students were paid \$15 for their participation and provided with an extra \$10 cash lottery ticket as a negotiation incentive. The compensation was paid in U.S. currency.

### Simulation

Participants negotiated according to an adapted version of the “New Recruit,” an employment contract negotiation between a job candidate and a recruiter (Neale, 2000). The simulation included eight issues: two distributive issues (salary and starting date), four integrative issues (trade-offs among bonus, vacation time, payment of moving expenses, and insurance coverage), and two compatible issues (job assignment and location). (See Table 1 for the negotiation payoff tables).

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Insert Table 1 about here  
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The simulation was revised as an employment contract negotiation in a multinational company in which the case read that the company had several branches in the U.S. and the Republic of Korea. The roles in the negotiation, as either a candidate or a recruiter, were randomly assigned to (1) U.S. candidate and U.S. recruiter, (2) Korean candidate and Korean recruiter, (3) U.S. candidate and Korean recruiter, or (4) Korean candidate and U.S. recruiter. All U.S. participants received the instructions and the negotiation case in English, and they negotiated in English. Korean participants in an intracultural negotiation received all materials in Korean, and they negotiated in Korean. Korean participants in an intercultural negotiation received both Korean and English versions of the materials, and they negotiated with a U.S. partner in English (methodology adapted from Brett and Okumura, 1998). All materials that were translated into Korean were also back-translated into English to ensure accuracy (Brislin, 1970).

### **Procedure**

When participants arrived at the laboratory, they were randomly assigned to U.S.-U.S., Korean-Korean, or U.S.-Korean dyads. They first responded to the interdependent self-construal questionnaire described below (Singelis, 1994). Participants were then randomly assigned to either the candidate or recruiter role and told whether they would be negotiating with a U.S. or Korean national. After they prepared for the negotiations individually for 15 minutes, they responded to a short quiz to reaffirm the priorities and preferences incorporated in each negotiator role. One particular item, asking, "Who is your negotiation partner, U.S. national or Korean national?" made the ingroup-versus-outgroup social category salient in participants' minds. Other items included the following: "What is your role in this negotiation simulation?" "What are the two most

important issues for you?” and “What are the two least important issues for you?”

Participants were allowed to question the experimenter while working on the quiz to better understand their roles and the negotiation case as well as answer the quiz correctly.

Following the quiz, participants responded to an ingroup/outgroup judgment questionnaire described below (Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990).

Participants were then escorted to a negotiation room to meet their negotiation partners. Because most of the participants had no previous experience in business negotiation, and research has shown that novice negotiators perceive negotiation as competitive (O'Connor and Adams, 1999), the experimenter provided an incentive to encourage participants to use cooperative interdependence during integrative negotiation and reach win-win agreements. All negotiating pairs were informed that both of their names would be entered in a drawing for an additional \$10 cash gift if their dyad reached agreement on all eight issues. After 40 minutes of negotiation, a contract sheet was collected from each dyad. Participants responded to the cooperative process report described below, the ingroup/outgroup judgment questionnaire, and a demographic questionnaire. Finally, they were debriefed, thanked, and paid.

## **Measures**

**Independent variable.** *Interdependent self-construal* was measured by statements such as: “It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group,” “My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me,” and “I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my own accomplishments” (Singelis, 1994).

The entire scale was factor-analyzed across the U.S. and Korean samples. To obtain internal consistency and reliability, only items having a similar factor-loading across the two cultural samples were included. As a result, Cronbach's alpha for seven items of the interdependent self-construal was 0.62.<sup>1</sup>

**Dependent variable.** The *ingroup/outgroup judgment* questionnaire was adapted from versions used in previous research (e.g., Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990). Participants were asked to rate their ingroup (people of the same nationality, U.S. or Korean) and the specific outgroup (U.S. or Korean) on several attributes that are listed below (1 = not at all true to 7 = very much true) both before and after negotiating. Favorable judgment scores of the ingroup and outgroup were obtained by subtracting scores on the negative attributes ("greedy," "disrespectful," "hostile," "stubborn," "competitive") from the positive attributes ("honest," "likable," "intelligent," "cooperative," "sincere," "friendly," "competent," "generous").

**Control variables.** Because research has found that cooperation (e.g., Allport, 1954; Deutsch, 1973; Sherif et al., 1954) and mutually beneficial outcomes from an integrative negotiation result in favorable judgment of outgroups (Thompson, 1993), I entered cooperative process during negotiation and integrative outcomes as covariates when analyzing post-negotiation judgment of an ingroup and outgroup (Hypothesis 4 and 5).

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<sup>1</sup> In the initial validation of the scale, using two samples, Singelis (1994) reported Cronbach's alpha to be 0.73 and 0.74 for the interdependent items. Compared with these results, the reliabilities obtained in the sample of the present study were lower. However, other studies on self-construal have reported similar Cronbach's alphas. For example, Kurman (2001) used the same self-construal scale as that used in this study and reported Cronbach's alphas of 0.56, 0.56, and 0.57 for the interdependence scale for Singaporean, Druze, and Jewish samples, respectively.

*Cooperative process* was measured by asking participants to rate to what extent they would characterize the negotiation process as “cooperative,” “friendly,” “quarrelsome” (reverse coded), “pleasant,” “trusting,” and “useful” (1 = not at all to 7 = very much;  $\alpha = 0.88$ ).

Following Tripp and Sondak (1992), *integrative outcomes* were measured by individual negotiators’ Pareto efficiency scores. Pareto efficiency is the extent to which an agreement approaches the point at which no additional joint gains are possible. Because joint profit (i.e., the sum of each negotiator’s individual profit) confounds Pareto efficiency and the distribution of resources, it often engenders misleading conclusions. Thus, Pareto efficiency is a better measure of the quality of mutual agreement than joint profit (Tripp and Sondak, 1992). The Pareto program (Version 1.11)<sup>2</sup> calculated Pareto efficiency as  $1 - \frac{\text{(the number of possible agreements Pareto superior to the reference agreement)}}{\text{(the sum of the number of possible agreements Pareto superior to the agreement and the number of possible agreements Pareto inferior to the agreement)}}$ .

### **Analysis**

The primary independent variable, interdependent self-construal, is conceptually and methodologically an individual-level construct (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Hence, all analyses were kept at the individual level. Because the hypotheses drew a comparison between individuals who had a high or low level of interdependent self-construal, the level of interdependent self-construal was obtained by median split of the whole sample ( $M = 4.74$ ,  $Median = 4.71$ ,  $SD = 0.82$ ). For the Korean sample, 36 participants (63.2%) were categorized as having a high level, and 21 participants (36.8%) were categorized as having

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<sup>2</sup> The Pareto program was developed for Gerardo Okhuysen by Chris Pounds (11/2002) based on Tripp and Sondak’s (1992) theoretical framework.

a low level of interdependent self-construal. For the U.S. sample, 20 participants (35.7%) were categorized as having a high level, and 36 participants (64.3%) were categorized as having a low level of interdependent self-construal. The difference was statistically significant (Koreans:  $M = 5.02$ ,  $Median = 5.00$ ,  $SD = 0.82$  vs. U.S.:  $M = 4.46$ ,  $Median = 4.43$ ,  $SD = 0.72$ ,  $chi-square(1) = 8.51$ ,  $p < .01$ ).

In this sample there was no significant correlation between judgment of an ingroup and outgroup (pre-negotiation:  $r = 0.13$ ,  $n.s.$ , post-negotiation:  $r = 0.04$ ,  $n.s.$ ). Thus I used univariate analyses instead of multivariate analysis for the ingroup and outgroup judgment.

When analyzing the post-negotiation hypotheses (Hypothesis 4 and 5), I controlled for dyad interdependency in the cooperative process report by entering two negotiators' (the focal negotiator and an opponent) process reports simultaneously in an ANCOVA model (Chen, Mannix, and Okumura, 2003). Also I conducted separate sets of ANCOVAs, one set controlling cooperative process and the other controlling Pareto efficiency, to compare the effects of cooperative process (Allport, 1954; Deutsch, 1973; Sherif et al., 1954) and integrative outcomes (Thompson, 1993), respectively, on the increase in outgroup (Hypothesis 4) and ingroup (Hypothesis 5) judgment.

## Results

### Descriptive Statistics

The mean age of the participants was 22.60 years. Korean participants were significantly older than U.S. participants (US:  $M = 19.95$ ; Koreans:  $M = 25.21$ ;  $t(111) = -7.72$ ,  $p < .01$ ). As age was significantly correlated with the ingroup judgment, age was entered as a covariate in all data analyses of the ingroup judgment. The U.S. sample had significantly more female than male participants (US: 38 females and 18 males; Koreans:

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28 females and 29 males;  $\chi^2(1) = 4.08, p < .05$ ). Yet gender was not significantly correlated with any of the independent or dependent variables; thus, gender was excluded in further analyses.

The negotiator role, as either a candidate or a recruiter, had no effect on the main dependent variable. Nor did it moderate the relationship between culture (U.S. or Korean) and the dependent variable. Therefore, the negotiator role was excluded in further analyses.

### **Test of Hypotheses**

Hypothesis 1 predicted that when planning for an intercultural negotiation, individuals who had a high level of interdependent self-construal would report more favorable judgment of an outgroup than individuals who had a low level of interdependent self-construal. Results from the t-test of participants in the intercultural negotiation showed that the means were consistent with the prediction (high interdependent self:  $M = 0.77$  vs. low interdependent self:  $M = 0.61$ ), yet they did not reach statistical significance ( $t < 1$ ). Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not supported.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that members of a cultural minority would report less-favorable judgment of an ingroup than members of the cultural majority. The data were submitted to a one-way ANCOVA with age as a covariate. Results showed that, as predicted, Korean participants reported less favorable judgment of an ingroup than U.S. participants (Koreans:  $M = -0.14$  vs. US:  $M = -0.05$ ),  $F(1, 110) = 5.67, p < .02$ . Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported.

Hypotheses 3a and 3b predicted that when planning for an intracultural negotiation, members of a cultural minority with a high level of interdependent self-construal would report more favorable judgment of an ingroup than members of a cultural minority with a

low level of interdependent self-construal (H3a); however, when planning for an intercultural negotiation, members of a cultural minority who had a high level of interdependent self-construal would report less favorable judgment of an ingroup than members of a cultural minority who had a low level of interdependent self-construal (H3b). The data were submitted to a 2 (country: U.S. vs. Korea) x 2 (interdependent self-construal: high vs. low level) x 2 (context: intracultural vs. intercultural) ANCOVA with age as a covariate. Supporting the hypotheses, a 2 (country) x 2 (interdependent self-construal) x 2 (context) interaction was significant,  $F(1, 104) = 4.47, p < .04$ . A planned comparison test further confirmed that a significant 2 (interdependent self-construal) x 2 (context) interaction appeared only in the Korean sample,  $F(1, 104) = 6.96, p < .01$ . As predicted, when planning for an intracultural negotiation, Korean participants who had a high level of interdependent self-construal reported more favorable judgment of an ingroup than Korean participants who had a low level of interdependent self-construal (high interdependent self:  $M = 0.29$  vs. low interdependent self:  $M = -0.68$ ). However, when planning for an intercultural negotiation, Korean participants with a high level of interdependent self-construal reported less favorable judgment of an ingroup than Korean participants with a low level (high interdependent self:  $M = -0.35$  vs. low interdependent self:  $M = 0.06$ ). Thus, Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b were supported. Figure 1 depicts these results.

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Hypothesis 4 predicted that after intercultural negotiation, individuals with a low level of interdependent self-construal would report a greater increase in favorable judgment of an outgroup than individuals with a high level of interdependent self-construal. The data were submitted to a 2 (interdependent self-construal: high vs. low level) x 2 (time: before vs. after negotiation: within-subject) repeated-measure ANCOVA among the participants who negotiated intercultural. Change in the favorable judgment of an outgroup was measured and analyzed with the time (within-subject) factor in the repeated-measure ANCOVA model (i.e., time 1: judgment before negotiation vs. time 2: after negotiation). Cooperative process as well as Pareto efficiency were entered as covariates.

First, Hypothesis 4 was tested with cooperative process reports as covariates. Results demonstrated that unlike the prediction, however, a 2 (interdependent self-construal) x 2 (time) interaction was not significant ( $F = 1$ ). The covariate cooperative process was significant (the focal negotiator's report,  $F(1, 28) = 8.17, p < .01$ ). In sum, when the cooperative process was controlled for, interdependent self-construal had no effect on the negotiator's increase in favorable judgment of an outgroup after intercultural negotiation. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was not supported when the cooperative process was controlled for.

Hypothesis 4 was also tested with the focal negotiator's Pareto efficiency index as a covariate. Results showed that when the Pareto efficiency index was entered as a covariate, a 2 (interdependent self-construal) x 2 (time) interaction was marginally significant,  $F(1, 26) = 3.90, p = .06$ . Specifically, as predicted, after intercultural negotiation, individuals with a low level of interdependent self-construal reported a greater

increase in favorable judgment of an outgroup (before negotiation:  $M = 0.61$  vs. after negotiation:  $M = 1.41$ ) than individuals with a high level of interdependent self-construal (before negotiation:  $M = 0.82$  vs. after negotiation:  $M = 1.17$ ). The focal negotiator's Pareto efficiency score was not significant, however. Thus, Hypothesis 4 received marginal support when Pareto efficiency was controlled for.

Hypothesis 5 predicted that after intracultural negotiation, members of a cultural minority with a low level of interdependent self-construal would report a greater increase in favorable judgment of an ingroup than members of a cultural minority with a high level of interdependent self-construal. The data were submitted to a 2 (country: U.S. vs. Korea) x 2 (interdependent self-construal: high vs. low) x 2 (time: before vs. after negotiation: within-subject) repeated-measure ANCOVA with age as a covariate among the participants who negotiated intraculturally. Cooperative process as well as Pareto efficiency were entered as covariates.

First, Hypothesis 5 was tested with cooperative process reports as covariates. As predicted, a 2 (country) x 2 (interdependent self-construal) x 2 (time) interaction was significant,  $F(1, 71) = 4.16, p < .05$ . Planned comparison tests revealed that, as predicted, the increase in favorable judgment of an ingroup appeared only among Korean participants: after intracultural negotiation, Korean participants who had a low level of interdependent self-construal reported a greater increase in favorable judgment of an ingroup (before negotiation:  $M = -0.68$  vs. after negotiation:  $M = 0.29$ ) than Korean participants who had a high level of interdependent self-construal (before negotiation:  $M = 0.29$  vs. after negotiation:  $M = 0.38$ ),  $F(1, 71) = 8.46, p < .01$ . Also, the covariate, the focal negotiator's cooperative process report, was marginally significant,  $F(1, 71) = 3.51, p =$

.07. In sum, the cooperative process during intracultural negotiation increased the negotiator's favorable judgment of an ingroup (e.g., Allport, 1954; Deutsch, 1973). Still, interdependent self-construal had the effect of increasing the negotiator's favorable judgment of an ingroup after intracultural negotiation above and beyond the cooperative process. Thus, Hypothesis 5 was supported when the cooperative process was controlled for. Figure 2 depicts these results.

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Insert Figure 2 about here  
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Hypothesis 5 was also tested with the focal negotiator's Pareto efficiency index as a covariate. As predicted, a 2 (country) x 2 (interdependent self-construal) x 2 (time) interaction was marginally significant,  $F(1, 62) = 2.78, p = .10$ . Planned comparison tests revealed that, as predicted, only Korean participants who had a low level of interdependent self-construal reported a greater increase in favorable judgment of an ingroup than Korean participants who had a high level of interdependent self-construal after intracultural negotiation,  $F(1, 62) = 10.51, p < .01$ . The covariate, Pareto efficiency, was not significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 received marginal support when Pareto efficiency was controlled for.

### **Discussion**

The current study contributes to the literature on negotiation and intergroup relations by demonstrating that integrative negotiation facilitates favorable judgment of an ingroup and outgroup. The results highlight that negotiating interculturally on integrative

issues enhances the outgroup judgment between members of the cultural majority and members of a cultural minority and that negotiating intraculturally on integrative issues improves the ingroup judgment within a cultural minority. Moreover, the current study extends the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner et al., 1993) and social categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) by demonstrating the effect of interdependent self-construal on judgment timing.

Consistent with the hypotheses, members of a cultural minority who had a high level of interdependent self-construal reported favorable judgment of an ingroup early when planning for an intracultural negotiation. In contrast, members of a cultural minority who had a low level of interdependent self-construal increased favorable judgment of an ingroup after intracultural negotiation. Unlike the prediction, however, individuals who had a high level of interdependent self-construal did not start an intercultural negotiation with favorable judgment of an outgroup, although individuals who had a low level of interdependent self-construal, as predicted, developed favorable judgment of an outgroup after intercultural negotiation. Overall, individuals might make a less-certain judgment of an outgroup than an ingroup, as we are psychologically closer to, and more familiar with, an ingroup. Before negotiation with an outgroup, therefore, individuals might not be confident about their judgment of an outgroup. This speculation appears to explain why favorable judgment of an outgroup did not arise when individuals who had a high level of interdependent self-construal anticipated an intercultural negotiation.

The current study investigated how interdependent self-construal affects the timing of ingroup and outgroup judgment over the course of integrative negotiation. A fruitful area for future study is to examine how early judgment of an ingroup and outgroup

influences first offers, tactics, and negotiation moves in intergroup negotiation. Research has found that the perception of superordinate group membership increases cooperative intergroup behavior (Gaertner et al., 1990). Also, Gelfand and Christakopoulou (1999) found that Greek negotiators (i.e., those who have a high level of interdependent self-construal) used cooperative tactics, whereas US negotiators (i.e., those who have a low level of interdependent self-construal) used threats, warnings and putdowns. By starting with favorable judgment of an ingroup and outgroup, negotiators with a high level of interdependent self-construal might behave integratively from the beginning of a negotiation and lead negotiating dyads to integrative moves and outcomes.

Given that individuals who have a low level of interdependent self-construal care about interdependence and relationships much less than individuals who have a high level of interdependent self-construal, how could individuals who have a low level develop superordinate categorization and, in turn, favorable judgment of the other party's cultural group after negotiating? Even when cooperative process and Pareto efficiency were controlled for, low levels of interdependent self-construal still had an independent effect on ingroup and outgroup judgment after negotiation. This highlights interdependent self-construal's malleability and sensitivity to situational cues and even subtle priming (Gardner, Gabriel, and Lee, 1999). Similar to the American participants in Gardner and colleagues' (1999) study, who were presumed to have a low level of interdependent self-construal, yet demonstrated highly interdependent and collectivistic judgment after being exposed to interdependent self-construal priming, participants who had a chronically low level of interdependent self-construal in the current study might have increased their level of interdependence after working on an interdependent task such as integrative negotiation.

Of course, the data in the current study cannot confirm this possibility because participants' levels of interdependent self-construal after negotiation were not measured. However, recall that individuals who had a low level of interdependent self-construal exhibited levels of favorable judgment of an ingroup and outgroup similar to the levels of those who had a high level of interdependent self-construal whose ingroup and outgroup judgment was already favorable at the outset of the negotiations. Thus, it appears that this conjecture is plausible with the current data. Future study warrants thorough investigation of task type (either independent or interdependent task) and the malleability of interdependent self-construal (becoming either less interdependent or highly interdependent depending on independent or interdependent task type, respectively).

The findings of the current study highlight the relative effects of processes and outcomes of integrative negotiation on the judgment of an ingroup and outgroup. While the cooperative process turned out to be universally beneficial for improving the judgment of an ingroup and outgroup, the integrative outcome of negotiating with an ingroup or outgroup opponent had no significant effect on the judgment. This result is consistent with the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner et al., 1990), i.e., cooperation encourages favorable judgment of outgroups (Allport, 1954; Deutsch, 1973; Sherif et al., 1954) through superordinate categorization with the outgroup members. It is speculated that when negotiators make the superordinate categorization during negotiation, their interdependent self-construal becomes operative (e.g., Stapel and Koomen, 2001). Brockner et al. (2000) demonstrated that interdependent self-construal is associated with heightened concern for the process of social exchange. Related to this is the possibility that the negotiators in the current study might have cared more for the process than the

outcome of a negotiation. Future research should examine the relative effects of cooperative process and integrative outcome of negotiation and clarify boundary conditions where the outcome of an integrative negotiation accounts for the improvement of outgroup judgment (e.g., Thompson, 1993).

The data in the current study replicated the negative ingroup judgment within a cultural minority as outlined in the literature on cultural adaptation (e.g., Kim, 1995; Liebkind and Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2000). In particular, the unfavorable judgment of an ingroup was apparent when members of a cultural minority who had a high level of interdependent self-construal interacted with members of the cultural majority. Given that high levels of interdependent self-construal have been shown to encourage strong loyalty to the ingroup and commitment to the ingroup's collective interests (e.g., Triandis, 1989; Chen, Brockner, and Katz, 1998), the findings of the current study disclose an interesting counterpoint. That is, individuals who have a high level of interdependent self-construal may not always be faithful to, and sometimes have negative attitudes toward, their ingroup (Buchan, Croson, and Dawes, 2002; Lee, Adair, and Mannix, 2003). Thus, it is meaningful to ask how interdependence is defined and changed by social context. As Brewer (1991) argues, the definition of an ingroup, whether it is determined by imposed group membership (i.e., country of origin) or dependent on an individual's psychological affiliation with a group, has been underinvestigated. Research on social categorization and intergroup relations should consider the assimilation-based social comparison in terms of interdependent self-construal (Stapel and Koomen, 2001; Aaker and Schmitt, 2001; Kim and Markus, 1999). The social categorization facilitated by interdependent self-construal might be malleable depending on social context and motivate a perception of similarity

even with an outgroup member. Thus, various types of group membership might be important in shaping the fluid boundaries of ingroups and outgroups.

A limitation of the current study is that it disallows *causal* conclusions because the primary independent variable, interdependent self-construal, was not experimentally manipulated. Although the current study's longitudinal design mitigates this concern, future investigation may use Brewer and Gardner's (1996) or Ybarra and Trafimow's (1998) experimental priming method of interdependent self-construal to test its causal effect on initial or subsequent judgment of an ingroup or outgroup.

### **Conclusion**

How can ingroup and outgroup relations have a more positive effect on people's experience of living in a culturally heterogeneous society? The current study demonstrates that integrative negotiation improves judgment of an ingroup and outgroup among members of the cultural majority and members of a cultural minority. Negotiations pervade our daily lives—we negotiate with colleagues, strangers, friends, supervisors, and spouses (e.g., Bazerman and Neale, 1992; Lewicki et al., 1999). The current study elucidates that negotiating with an ingroup or outgroup member on a day-to-day basis can have significantly positive effects on intergroup relations. Ultimately, the negotiation dynamics will contribute to social integration and amicable intergroup relations in ever-more-globalizing and multicultural organizations and societies.

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Table 1. Negotiation Payoffs (New Recruit)

<b>Issue</b>	<b>Options</b>	<b>Candidate Points</b>	<b>Recruiter Points</b>
Bonus	10%	4000	0
	8%	3000	400
	6%	2000	800
	4%	1000	1200
	2%	0	1600
Job assignment	Division A	0	0
	Division B	-600	-600
	Division C	-1200	-1200
	Division D	-1800	-1800
	Division E	-2400	-2400
Vacation time	25 days	1600	0
	20 days	1200	1000
	15 days	800	2000
	10 days	400	3000
	5 days	0	4000
Starting date	June 1	2400	0
	June 15	1800	600
	July 1	1200	1200
	July 15	600	1800
	August 1	0	2400
Moving expense	100%	3200	0
	90%	2400	200
	80%	1600	400
	70%	800	600
	60%	0	800
Insurance	Plan A	800	0
	Plan B	600	800
	Plan C	400	1600
	Plan D	200	2400
	Plan E	0	3200
Salary	\$50,000	0	-6000
	\$48,000	-1500	-4500
	\$46,000	-3000	-3000
	\$44,000	-4500	-1500
	\$42,000	-6000	0
Location	San Francisco	1200	1200
	Atlanta	900	900
	Chicago	600	600
	Boston	300	300
	Denver	0	0

Figure 1. A cultural minority's judgment of an ingroup (Korea) before intra- and intercultural negotiation as a function of levels (low vs. high) of interdependent self-construal (Hypothesis 3a and 3b)




Figure 2. A cultural minority's judgment of an ingroup (Korea) before and after intracultural negotiation as a function of levels (low vs. high) of interdependent self-construal (Hypothesis 5)

